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DISAGGREGATING CORPUS CHRISTI: ILLIBERAL




Many practice their religion within the context of structured,
hierarchical organizations,1 yet legal discourse on religious freedom
too often fails to open the black box of the church with an eye to-
wards justice.2 Legal scholars talk of freedom for the church, but not
of freedom within the church.3 They do so notwithstanding the noto-
rious and horrifying scandals of contemporary religious history.4
The crimes of statutory rape, pedophilia, and child abuse committed
by religious leaders shock to the very core.5 But jurisprudence is
nevertheless loathe to subject internal church decision-making to
public scrutiny.6 This should come as no surprise. The U.S. has a long
history of support for religious liberty; the U.S. Supreme Court has a
* Ph.D. Candidate, Columbia University; M. Phil., Columbia University (2015);
L.L.M., Temple University (2011); J.D., College of William and Mary Marshall-
Wythe School of Law (2005); B.A., University of Pennsylvania (2002). I am
greatly indebted to Prof. Jean L. Cohen, Nell and Herbert Singer Professor of Po-
litical Thought at Columbia University, as many of the ideas contained here
were developed during a seminar led by her during the spring of 2014. 1 also
wish to thank my colleagues Nathanial Mull, Ashraf Ahmed, Kevin Elliott, Guido
Parietti, Luise Papke, Robert Goodman, and Ben Mueser for their helpful com-
ments and critique. All mistakes and omissions are my own.
See RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GoD 107 (2013).
2 For a representative example, see MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL:




6 As evidenced by broad, bipartisan public support for the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (1993), which en-
hanced protections for religious organizations from democratic lawmaking.
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"special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations."7 Thus,
government meddling with that liberty is, to say the least, taken by
many to be inherently suspect. 8
Freedom within the business corporation, in stark contrast,
is a popular and well-established subject of discourse with the legal
academy. Scholars seem perfectly willing to analyze the justices and
injustices involved in internal business organizations. For "it is now
widely accepted that the precious freedoms upon which government
could not intrude are of little or no utility to those, who by the neces-
sity to eat and find shelter, are forced to spend their lives in cease-
less, bone-grinding, dangerous, and life-shortening toil."10 According-
ly, many accept that a business does not have free reign to deal with
its employees, shareholders, and customers as it may. Rules of fair
bargaining, minimum wage laws, and the like constrain the liberty of
corporate bosses in the interest of the liberty of workers." Similarly,
thousands of pages-both of judicial opinion and scholarly excur-
sus-inspect and critique the treatment of stockholders by company
directors and executives.
Yet curiously, except upon manifestations of the gross abus-
es, rarely does scholarship inquire as to the status of the individual
rights of church members against abuses perpetrated by religious
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
697 (2012).
HAMILTON, supra note 2, at ch. 1.
See, e.g., Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multidimensional
Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97,
141 (2009) ("Deep concern about the state's potential ability to threaten indi-
vidual liberties results in an insistence on establishing laws to protect individu-
al rights. There is little concern that corporate persons might grow to be so
powerful that they too could have the capacity to violate individual rights.").
10 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Vice Chancellor, Del. Ct. of Chancery, Human Freedom and
Two Friedmen: Musings On the Implications of Globalization For The Effective
Regulation Of Corporate Behavior, University of Toronto Torys Lecture (Sept
20, 2007), in U. PENN. FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP, Paper 180, at 6,
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1179&context=f
aculty-scholarship.
11 See, e.g., id.; Dalia Tsuk, Corporations without Labor: The Politics of Progressive
Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1861 (2003).
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"bosses." Rather, it focuses on the rights of the group as a whole
when they meet with obstacles presented by outsiders, whether
those outsiders be private persons, other groups, or the state itself.12
The recent Hobby Lobbyl3 litigation; however, presents a unique op-
portunity to examine how the rights of individual members fare in
the context of group religious exercise. If only because the back-
ground noise of balance sheets, quarterly earnings, and financialized
fiduciary duties leaves room for the kind of dispassionate analysis
unavailable in other circumstances.
This Article will, therefore, begin to assess the insides of
group religious practice by taking a peek behind the veil of the busi-
ness corporation. In Part II, I argue that how the law defines a corpo-
ration will shape the kinds of religious rights and freedoms that such
groups can assert on their own behalf. The application of each onto-
logical understanding of the corporation bears fruitful insights about
the kinds of legitimate claims to religious freedom the corporation
may claim, regardless of whether it is registered, unregistered, close-
ly held, for-profit, non-profit, or otherwise. These legal conceptions
of corporate personhood are undoubtedly helpful when it comes to
defining group rights as against outsiders. They, however, provide
less helpful guidance when it comes to resolving conflicts between
the rights of the group and those of their own members. Indeed, each
conceptualization tends to gloss over, ignore, or deny the existence
of hierarchical, non-consensual relationships that may do damage to
individual rights that happen to fall within the corporation's sphere
of influence. Whether one understands the corporation as a nexus of
individual contracts, a state concession, or a real entity, internal im-
balances of power threaten the freedoms valued by liberal demo-
cratic polities.
Though legal theory may not provide the satisfying answers
we seek, another intellectual tradition may be of some use. Namely,
the study of power and its justification is the particular provenance
of political theory. I therefore enlist political theory in Part III to ar-
gue that legal scholars should not look to a discourse on legal per-
sonhood to resolve the conflicts and dilemmas within the black box
12 See generally HAMILTON, supra note 2.
13 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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that is religion, incorporated. They should look, rather, to the con-
ceptions of toleration and voluntariness that lie at the very core of
liberal religious freedom. Thus, inasmuch as the Supreme Court re-
lied on the personhood discourse in its Hobby Lobby decision, 14it
veered a bit off the track.
Had it applied instead the ideas of voluntariness and tolera-
tion, it might have inhibited the potential for the harmful exercise of
corporate religious rights. And it might have done so while also satis-
factorily respecting individual liberties and legitimate group claims
to religious freedom. Just such an application is provided in Part IV.
11. THEORIES OF CORPORATION AND GROUP RIGHTS TO RELIGIOUS
EXERCISE
Legal discourse invokes three ontological understandings of
the corporation.15 The choice between them is not inconsequential.
As shown below, a determination of whether the corporate phenom-
enon arises thanks to a concession from the state, from an aggrega-
tion of individuals, or as a real social entity with autonomous agency
will commit us to certain conceptions of group rights. Each concep-
tion implies a different understanding of, the scope and content of
the rights that the group may claim. Regardless of which group right
to free exercise is implied, however, each presents risks to individual
members' own freedoms.
14 See id at 2768, 2779. The Court first invokes an aggregation theory of group
rights when it argues that the rights of the corporation are simply the collective
rights of its individual shareholders, officers, and employees. Id. at 2768. Later,
the Court implies a real entity theory of group rights when it refers to the "hon-
est conviction" of non-human corporate entities (appealing to a real-entity con-
ception). Id. at 2779.
1 See, e.g., PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 35-38
(1984); see generally Ripken, supra note 9, at 100-01; Katharine V. Jackson, To-
wards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate Governance: A Compara-
tive Analysis, 7 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 309, 329-339 (2011) (explaining the "fiction"
of concession theory, hailing from Roman legal principle, "aggregative" theories
popular in the U.S. since the 1970s, and "realentity" theory, invented by nine-
teenth century German sociologists).
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A. Aggregation Theories of the Corporation
Aggregation theories of corporation, exemplified perhaps
most famously by Michael Jensen and William. Meckling's theory of
the firm, posit that the corporation as such has no independent, au-
tonomous existence.17 Rather, it is an aggregation of individuals act-
ing interdependently through reciprocal agreements.8 The individu-
al members of the corporation may collaborate to pursue some joint
goal; they may also indirectly pursue a joint goal as a means to
achieve their more immediate individual interests.9 For example, an
employee may indirectly pursue a joint goal of corporate profits
while working to achieve her immediate goal of earning a living. Re-
alizing that her wages depend upon corporate revenues, she volun-
tarily and jointly with other corporate stakeholders works to ensure
the business stays afloat. Often, such conceptions of corporation re-
fer to the corporate phenomenon as a "nexus of contracts," wherein
an individual member bargains in her own interest, whether that in-
terest is unique or shared by the rest of the membership, against
each other member of the group, who each possess her own personal
and joint interests.2 0 Resulting from the several bargains is a cohe-
sive organization of individuals who have agreed to perform specific
functions or to donate certain assets in exchange for the benefits of
the functions and assets donated by others.
However, horizontal coordination proves unwieldy and inef-
ficient, especially as members have only imperfect information re-
garding future circumstances. As a result, aggregation theories assert
that members will commonly agree to a hierarchical decision-
making structure to set the precise terms of everyone's bargains on a
16 Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. OF FIN. EcoN. 305, 305-60 (1976).
Id. at 310-11. This is also an implication of the authors' methodological indi-
vidualism, an ontology shared by most mainstream economists.
" Id. at 310.
19 Id. at 312 (discussing "agency costs").
20 See generally Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means
and 20th-Century American Legal Thought, 30 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 179, 183 (2005).
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day-to-day basis.21 In other words, because their initial contracts
with one another are "incomplete," members rationally .consent to
autocratic governance.22
1. The Group Rights Implied by Aggregation Theory
Aggregation theories of corporation correspond well with
notions of group rights understood as rights, or interests, held jointly
and severally by group members who share an interest in achieving
some end.23 "Under this view of the corporate person, the rights and
duties of an incorporated association are in reality the rights and du-
ties of the persons who compose it, and not of an imaginary being."24
Stated differently, corporate rights "supervene" upon the rights of
their individual members.25 Moreover, such rights need not be re-
ducible without remainder to an aggregation of individual rights.
Margalit and Raz, for example, derive a group right to self-
21 See, e.g., FRANK EASTERBROOK, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
(1991); Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical
Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1643 (2002).
22 R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, ECONoMicA 386, 398-400 (1937). Under
nexus-of-contracts theories, corporate law is understood (perhaps somewhat
naively) as providing "default rules" to which freely bargaining parties to the
corporate group might agree. It is meant, in other words, to provide a public
good by reducing the transaction costs of shareholders, directors, executives,
and incorporators. See Easterbrook, supra n. 21 at 15. In fact, much of the Dela-
ware corporate code is subject to waiver or modification, depending upon the
parties' unique preferences. See, e.g., 8 Del. C. Ann. § 102(b)(7) (fiduciary duty
of care is waivable). It should be observed, however, that none of these "default
rules" contain any provisions for employees. They, apparently, must pay their
own transaction costs from their own (smaller) wallets. See Frederick Mark
Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby
Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51, 65
(2014).
They need not, of course, share all their interests. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 132-34
(1971).
24 Ripken, supra note 9 at 110 (citation omitted); see also Peter Jones, Human
Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples' Rights, 21 HUM. RTs. Q. 80, 105-07 (1999).
2 CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN AND STATUS
OF CORPORATE AGENTS 59 (2011).
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determination from a notion of individual well-being that includes
individual dignity, self-respect, and opportunity.26 Under this theory,
for example, while a group as a whole may benefit from a growing
economy, not every group member need benefit individually from
that growth before the group can claim a right to it.2 7 Nor need the
members successfully claim an individual right to, and impose duties
on others to provide, economic growth.28 It is enough that a group
right to growth is in each individual member's interests in some
fashion, however indirect.29 A group-right to growth may, for exam-
ple, provide individuals with better employment opportunities in the
future. Consequently, "the relative independence of group interest is
compatible with the view that . . . the moral importance of the
group's interest depends on its value to individuals.3 0 In other
words, a group need not fit perfectly into an ontological conception
of individualism, or perfectly "supervene,31 before liberal morality
can be applied.2
Applying this logic, a group right to the free exercise of reli-
gion, under the aggregation theory, can arise from the interests of
the individual members.3 3 If each member independently enjoys an
interest in, or right to, the free exercise of her religion within and
among the company of fellow corporate members, the corporation
as a whole may assert a claim to the free exercise of religion. This is
true even if no single person within the group can sensibly claim a
right to an autonomous religious community on her own, without
the participation of the other members. Or, in the parlance of con-
tract, individual members express their shared interests by "con-
senting" to the exercise of religion together. And that consent may
26 See generally Avishi Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J.
PHIL 439-61 (1990).
2 7 Id. at 449.
28 Id. at 449-50.
29
'o Id. at 450.
31 LIsT & PETTIT, supra note 25, at 59. Margalit and Raz's group right fits nicely
with List and Pettit's "holistic supervenience."
32 Vernon Van Dyke, Collective Ethics and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal
Democratic Thought, in GROUP RIGHTS: PERSPECTIVES SINCE 1900 181 (Julia
Stapleton ed., 1995).
33 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct 2751, 2768 (2014).
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include an agreement o abide by the corporation's decisional hier-
archy.
This is the conception of group rights and corporate person-
hood explicitly invoked by Justice Alito in Hobby Lobby when he ad-
dresses the First Amendment free exercise claims of the petition-
ers.4 According to Justice Alito, "[w]hen rights, whether
constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the pur-
pose is to protect the rights of these people" including shareholders,
officers, and employees associated with a corporation. The claim
arises not from the corporation itself. It is, instead, derived from its
individual members-a derivative claim par excellence. Justice Alito
maintains that, separate from the owners or employees, a corpora-
tion cannot do anything at all, let alone pray, worship, or observe
sacraments.36 Hence, the corporation under the ontology applied by
Justice Alito has no independent claims to free exercise rights.37
2. The Illiberal Implications of Aggregation Theory
Although aggregation theories implicitly incorporate, and
therefore recognize, individual rights, they prove problematic for
several reasons. First, a moral discourse atomizing the corporation
into individual interests and private rights risks neglecting the ex-
ploitative impact of the unequal distribution of corporate and indi-
vidual resources on the exercise of those rights. Second, it is not at
all clear that one could reasonably infer consent to the corporate
leadership's direction regarding religious matters from an open-
ended employment contract. Finally, even if such consent proves ex-




37 Id. at 2755.
3 Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, 20 PoL. THEORY 105, 113-
14 (1992).
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claims to religious freedoms might be aggregated into a cohesive and
rational group claim.39
Aggregation theory as applied in modern legal discourse,
viewing .the corporation as a nexus-of-contractsbetween equal indi-
viduals, suggests that the parties lying in the path of corporate ac-
tion, whether "insider" or "outsider," can and do adequately protect
their interests and rights via contract." As a result, that discourse
presumes, usually post facto, that individuals have willingly granted
broad discretion to some corporate hierarchy to legislate over a va-
riety of matters.41 This hierarchy might then claim a corporate right
to religious freedom because it can point to its members' broad con-
sent to any decisions it takes. However, facts on the ground suggest
that bargaining power between corporate members often remains
anything but equal.4 2 If bargaining power is indeed unequal, the con-
sent to religious governance implied by open-ended employment
contracts and stockholder certificates may reflect not so much
shared interests in religious exercise but instead the presence of ex-
39 See, e.g., LIST & PETTIT, supra note 25, at 42 (explaining the difficulties of ag-
gregating preferences into a cohesive and rational corporate intent).
4 See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Codetermination and Corporate Governance in a Multina-
tional Business Enterprise, 24 J. CORP. L. 975 (1999); Tsuk, supra note 20, at 183;
see generally Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Cbrporate Law: The Role of
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 659 (2006) ("This assumption proves
problematic to the extent that stakeholder contracts are deficient. . . . [Their]
contracts are neither complete nor perfectly priced.... [Clontracts . . .are often
illiquid and lacking both hedging options and market valuations."); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 U.C.LA. L. REV.
601, 614-15 (2006) (stating that workers are protected by the labor market,
collective bargaining, severance pay, etc.).
41 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers,
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 779-81 (2006).
42 See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 40, at 984 ("Our national labor policy is focused on
providing parity in bargaining power by facilitating collective bargaining by un-
ions in order to offset the collective action problem inherent in coordinating
employee interests. The structural relationship between shareholders and
managers on the one hand, and labor on the other, contemplate arms length
dealing, if not outright conflict, as opposed to the comparatively cooperative re-
lationship among the three groups under the German approach.") (internal
quote omitted).
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ploitation or coercion.43 A worker's ongoing employment in the face
of corporate religious exercise, moreover, does not imply consent to
a hierarchy's instructions regarding religious practices." Simply,
employees' need for work, especially when considered concurrently
with a corporation's superior resources and a slack labor market,
may lead them to accept only grudgingly employment conditions
that they would rather avoid.45 Because "the whole contractarian
ethos derives its appeal from the claim that each individual's consent
is a condition of [ legitimacy," a claim to exercise religion on behalf
of the corporation, in the context of unequal bargaining power, be-
comes problematic.4 Without contractarian legitimacy, the justifica-
tion for a group right weakens or may disappear.
There is good reason to believe that corporations cannot al-
ways, at least when it comes to religion, claim contractarian legiti-
macy.4 7 Inequalities in bargaining power, perhaps arising from
asymmetries in information and collective action costs, underlie the
equitable principles that protect minority shareholders under corpo-
43 See Gedicks & Kopelman, supra note 22, at 65 ("Of course, one can easily im-
agine why employees lacking contractual or collective-bargaining protection
are reluctant to intervene against challenges to the Mandate by their own em-
ployer."); IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE 150-51 (1999) (explaining how the
dual-market dynamic of unemployment and regressive redistribution chal-
lenge the justice of firm governance structures); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The
Problems Inherent in Litigating Employer Free Exercise Rights, 86 U. CoLo. L. REV.
1141, 1166-67 (2015) ("The expansion of an employer's free exercise rights
may eventually leave the employee with the potentially unpalatable option of
working at a workplace governed by potentially limiting work rules allowed
under the employer's newly recognized free exercise rights, or quitting.").
4 Chambers, supra note 43, at 166-67 (discussing how the lack of realistic exit
options opens the employee to arbitrary and dominating commands from em-
ployers).
45 Id.
4 Margalit & Raz, supra note 26, at 456.
47.See, e.g., David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of
the Corporation, 107 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 139, 149-50 (2013) (describing
hierarchical decision-making power due to, inter alia, management's control
over corporate resources).
rate law.4 Stockholders may be in no position to observe or to influ-
ence director and executive behavior as it impacts their religious be-
liefs.49 Even if they could, however, Delaware law might well deny
stockholders the ability to do anything about it.50 One might also
suggest hat the federal regulations protecting workers likewise im-
plicitly recognize inequalities in bargaining power that characterize
employee-employer relations. Furthermore, critics 'of nexus-of-
contracts theories malign them for failing to address the implications
of excluding non-shareholder "stakeholders" from legal corporate
governance structures.51 These stakeholders--employees, communi-
ty members, major creditors and customers-are, just as much as
any stockholder, susceptible to discrimination, exploitation, and loss
as a result of inequitable director and executive conduct.5 2 Yet, unlike
stockholders, they cannot vote. Without the vote, they cannot hold
48 See, e.g., Theodor Baums & Kenneth E. Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection
Seriously? Corporate Governance in the U.S. and Germany, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 31, 35
(2005) ("[E]quity investors may be taken -advantage of in a number of ways.
Those in control of the firm-who may be its managers or its largest sharehold-
ers-may find ways to appropriate corporate assets and income for themselves
.... Or those in control may waste corporate resources ... through poor mana-
gerial investment and operating decisions."); Richard Mitchell, Anthony
O'Donnell & Ian Ramsay, Shareholder Value and Employee Interests: Intersec-
tions between Corporate Governance, Corporate Law and Labor Law, 23 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 417, 432-33 (2005).
49 See 8 Del. C. § 220 (2014).
50 Id. The statute limits judicial case law in relation to a stockholder's right to
inspect corporate books and records to business matters, not political or, poten-
tially, religious matters.
5 See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate
Law, 2 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 59, 72 (2005); Douglas Litowitz, The Corporation as
God, 30 J. CORP. L. 501, 502 (2005).
52 See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 40, at 659 (2006); Douglas M. Branson, The Very
Uncertain Prospect of "Global" Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL
INT'L L. J. 321, 326 (2001) ("[T]raditional forms of corporate governance, which
respond to the Berle-Means separation of ownership from control and the ensu-
ing agency cost problem, simply are not responsive to the problems the growth
of large multinationals portend. Worker exploitation, degradation of the envi-
ronment, economic imperialism, regulatory arbitrage, and plantation produc-
tion efforts by the growing stable of gargantuan multinationals, whose power
exceeds that of most nation states, is far higher on the global agenda than is
convergence in governance.").
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corporate leaders accountable for misbehavior. They therefore lack
the bargaining leverage this franchise right lends to shareholders.
Instead, the law presumes that contractual rights and exogenous
federal regulation adequately protect the stakeholder.53 This occa-
sionally insensitive presumption is not levied upon shareholders.5
Indeed, the corporate governance literature often applauds the fact
that these stakeholders possess no colorable claims to residual cor-
porate profit, no equitable claims for breaches of fiduciary duty, nor
any independent right to derivative standing.55 This is because their
exclusion from corporate governance structures helps maximize
corporate profitability.56 Whether the legal status quo ensures ade-
quate consent to corporate decision-making-including decisions
about religious exercise-is, therefore, a matter of ongoing legal con-
troversy.
* Tsuk,supra note 11, at 1861-64 (discussing how corporate law excludes
worker interests); Jackson, supra note 15, at 350-52 (2011) (discussing how
exogenous law protects non-shareholder interests); Strine, supra note 10, at 17.
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 442 (2001) ("Of course, asserting the primacy of shareholder
interests in corporate law does not imply that the interests of corporate stake-
holders must or should go unprotected. It merely indicates that the most effica-
cious legal mechanisms for protecting the interests of nonshareholder constitu-
encies-or at least all constituencies other than creditors-lie outside of
corporate law. For workers, this includes the law of labor contracting, pension
law, -health and safety law, and antidiscrimination law. For consumers, it in-
cludes product safety regulation, warranty law, tort law governing product lia-
bility, antitrust law, and mandatory disclosure of product contents and charac-
teristics. For the public at large, it includes environmental law and the law of
nuisance and mass torts."); Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 614-15 (asserting that
workers are protected by the labor market, collective bargaining, severance
pay, etc.).
5 See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 40, at 988 ("Within the contractarian framework,
residual claimants are simply those parties to the corporate contract who have
agreed to receive profits of the enterprise or to bear its losses .... [T]hose who
contract for the residual risk are contributors of equity capital; but they need
not be."); Fisch, supra note 40, at 657; Richard Mitchell et al., Shareholder Value
and Employee Interests: Intersections Between Corporate Governance, Corporate
Law and Labor Law, 23 Wis. INT'L L.J. 417, 427-28 (2005).
'6See Mitchell, supra note 55, at 427-28.
Even presuming the adequacy of contractual and federal pro-
tections, the consent actually given by workers to a corporate hier-
archy may in reality prove less broad than that corporate hierarchy
might assume.57 Without broad consent, many claims to group rights
may simply prove nonsensical.5 8 For example, if workers consent to
abide by the instructions of their superiors in regards to day-to-day
production-oriented tasks in a non-coercive handshake-deal, it is not
obvious that they also consent to abide by their superior's wishes as
to their conduct unrelated to those tasks. If they did not give any
such consent-not an impossibility in the context of a large, for-
profit business with 13,000 employees, as is the case with Hobby
Lobby 6_-_then the corporation could not assert a collective "group
right" to practice religion. This is simply because the individuals
making up the group never intended to assert such a right, nor to
delegate to the corporation the right to assert it on their behalf.61 Nor
may the corporation credibly claim employee consent by arguing
that religious exercise indirectly fulfills workers' express interests in
earning wages. Religion has only, at best, a tenuous connection to the
earning of the corporate revenues necessary to make payroll.62 If
such can be called consent, it is consent devoid of normative mean-
ing in a group rights discourse meant to give expression to individual
religious rights in a joint context.
1 See, e.g., A. John Simmons, Consent Theory for Libertarians, 22 Soc. PHIL. &
POL'Y 330, 342-43 (2005) (presenting an argument about making presumptions
about the existence of prior consent from present behavior).
" Id. at 348.
5 See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Problems Inherent in Litigating Employer Free
Exercise Rights, 86 U. COLo. L. REV. 1141, 1159 (2015) (discussing a similar prob-
lem with regards to shareholders).
a Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2763 (2014); Chambers,
supra note 59, at 1157-58.
61 See Chambers, supra note 59, at 1159 (2015).
62 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2795 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ("Religious or-
ganizations exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing to the same reli-
gious faith. Not so of for-profit corporations. Workers who sustain the opera-
tions of those corporations commonly are not drawn from one religious
community. Indeed, by law, no religion-based criterion can restrict the work
force of for-profit corporations.").
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To explain, equating consent to an open-ended employment
contract with an interest in free exercise, and then aggregating that
interest with others' similarly derived interests, to justify a group
right to free exercise does great insult to the importance of religious
freedom. If an employee agreed to support the assertion of a group
religious right merely in exchange for a wage, her interest is in the
wage, not the right of religious exercise. Ascertaining the group right
claimed should, therefore, involve tallying interests in wages (e.g., in
economic freedom), not tallying interests in free exercise. Moreover,
whatever normative force that justifies a peculiar group right to reli-
gious freedom remains absent if the claims to such freedom are
merely instrumental, namely, a kind of consent given as a means to
earn a living and to pay the rent-and not as an expression of deeply
held and genuine religious belief.63 As suggested by none other than
John Locke, described below," not much would be left of the mean-
ing of religious freedom if religious practice decayed into something
over which one could bargain for money and wages.65 Religion
should be more than that.
In any event, the Supreme Court, in Sherbert v. Verner,' im-
plied that a Hobson's choice between practicing one's religion and
maintaining active employment was no choice at all. The Court
ruled that the government could not deny unemployment benefits
63 See Chambers upra note 59, at 1171 ("The transmission of church members'
free exercise rights through their church may be strong, whereas the transmis-
sion of owners' free exercise rights though their corporation may be weak.").
6 See infra Part III.B.
65See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 5,
http://www.thefederalistpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/John-
Locke-A-Letter-Concerning-Toleration.pdf ("[B]ecause no man can so far aban-
don the care of his own salvation as blindly to leave to the choice of any other,
whether prince or subject, to prescribe to him what faith or worship he shall
embrace. For no man can, if he would, conform his faith to the dictates of anoth-
er.").
6 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
67 Id. at 404 ("[T]he pressure upon [the employee] to forego [her religious] prac-
tice is unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between following the pre-
cepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning
one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.").
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simply because an employee quit her job for religious reasons.68 It
was unfair, the Court held, to force someone to choose between her
religion and her livelihood.6 9 Why the same logic should not be ap-
plied to a Hobson's choice between unemployment or "coerced" reli-
gion is certainly not obvious..
Perhaps, therefore, it is telling that the majority opinion of
the Court in Hobby Lobby makes no reference to employees' actual
religious preferences.70 If it had, one can only wonder whether its
reasoning, based upon an aggregative ontology, might have fallen
apart.
Regardless, even if knowledge of individual religious beliefs
were before the Court, the holding might still be questioned. Aggre-
gation theories do not imply a precise procedure according to which
the joint and several interests of the individuals involved in the cor-
poration are to be ascertained and aggregated.7 1 Without the guid-
ance of a legitimate group-will-formation procedure, theories of ag-
gregated group rights risk favoring the individual rights of certain
individuals at the expense of the rights of others.72 For example,
simply taking a vote on individual religious preferences is insuffi-
cient. A tyranny of the majority might arise, wherein a plurality of
corporate constituents might shape how the group religious right is
6 Id.
69 id.
70 See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2751.
71 Margalit & Raz, supra note 26, at 456; see generally Brett H. McDonnell, The
Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REv. 777, 796-99 (2015) (making a
similar argument to Margalit & Raz, id.); Jones, supra note 24; Brittany Limes,
Note, Peering Into the Corporate Soul: Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius and
How For-Profit Corporations Exercise Religion, 91 DENV. U. L. REv. 661, 690-91
(2014) (presenting a rubric for aggregating such interests using a corporation's
organizational and operational aspects). Some political theorists maintain that
finding a group "will" from individual preferences is, as a matter of theoretical
necessity, impossible. See generally, Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept
ofSocial Welfare, 58 J. oF POL. EcoN. 328 (1950).
n See, e.g., LIST & PETTIT, supra note 31, at 50-58 (forming a collective will vio-
late, inter alia, the "anonymity" condition of group will formation, viz., the con-
dition that all members have equal voice in the determination).
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exercised at the expense of a dissenting minority.73 Moreover, mi-
nority "pre-consent" to the outcome of such a vote, even if that out-
come be other than what the minority might have wished, flies
against the purpose of individual rights.74 Religious rights are, after
all, generally understood to exist as a "trump" to democratic prac-
tice.7 On the other hand, a "tyranny of the minority" arises if corpo-
rate members' practice of free exercise rights is dependent on group
unanimity, i.e., on the lowest'common denominator of interests.76 If a
group may only claim the rights to which its members can all agree,
many individual rights may not-be vindicated. Essentially, a single
non-believer could veto the corporate religious exercise desired' by
everyone else. As a result, many theorists of liberal democracy be-
lieve "no procedure can fairly embody the preferences of all the gov-
erned."7
Given the problems finding meaningful consent to religious
exercise within the corporate context, and given the difficulties of
discerning a group-wide intent to practice religion, the aggregative
theory of the corporation seems to pose more questions than it an-
swers.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) ("Different-interests necessarily
exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common inter-
est, the rights of the minority will be insecure.").
74 See generally Jeremy Waldron, Taking Group Rights Carefully, LITIGATING
PERSPECTIVES FROM DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 203 (Grant Huschcroft &
Paul Rishwork eds., 2002); Dworkin, supra note 1; Chambers, supra note 59, at
1168.
7 See Waldron, supra note 74, at 203.
76 See generally Hans 0. Staub & Harry Zohn, The Tyranny of Minorities, 109
DAEDALUS 159 (1980); see IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE 14 (1999) (explaining
the weakness of consensus-based emocratic justice in that it papers over real-
life dissensus-but that the alternative is resort to the lowest common denomi-
nator of shared principles, i.e., a Rawlsian "overlapping consensus.").
n SHAPIRO,supra note 76, at 31.
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B. Concession Theories of Corporation
However, the concession theory of the corporation, invoked
by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent,78 fares no better. Its single-minded
focus on the application of legal concepts and its unquestioned ac-
ceptance of political determinations neglect to address real-life coer-
cive power structures that can impact members' own rights.
Under a concession theory, "[t]he corporation is, and must
be, the creature of the State. Into its nostrils the State must breathe
the breath of a fictitious life, for otherwise it would be no animated
body but individualistic dust."79 It is, as Justice Ginsburg states, "an
artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing only in contempla-
tion of law."80 The concession theory posits that corporations do not
exist unless and until the law recognizes them as such.81 In so recog-
nizing them, the state grants them legal privileges not available to
other individuals.82 Unlike aggregative theories, the concession theo-
ry holds that a corporation does not exist as a cohesive unit until cer-
tain laws enable it to organize, gather, and grow. Limited liability, le-
gal personality, and other such juridical concepts turn what would
otherwise be a mere aggregation of individuals, with their competing
7 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2802 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting).
7 OTTo V. GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE at xxx. (Frederic William
Maitland, trans., 1958).
8 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819)).
8 See, e.g., Liam Seamus O'Melinn, Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public
Personality of the Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 201, 201-202 (2005); LIST &
PETTIT, supra note 31, at 74 (describing the logic of concession theory); PETER A.
GOUREVITCH & JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE CONTROL: THE NEW
GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 91-92 (2005). For an example of a
normative political analysis incorporating a concession theory, see generally
Elizabeth Anderson, Equality and Freedom in the Workplace: Recovering Repub-
lican Insights, 31 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 2015, at 48 (applying republican the-
ory to a concession model of corporate personhood).
82 Ciepley, supra note 47, at 143-44. This point is, of course, weakened by the
fact of general incorporation. Corporate status is now, and has been for nearly a
century and a half, purely elective. Regardless, without such election, individu-
als and corporations are given very different treatment under the law.
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interests, into an autonomous whole with a fabricated, state-defined
"general will."83
The law provides life support to a corporation by providing it
with a legal artifice, or hedge, behind which much of corporate group
life goes unrecognized and, therefore, unregulated by the state.8 In
doing so, it endows the people guarding that hedgerow with deci-
sion-making authority over corporate affairs. In the contemporary
context, corporate law grants original, undelegated, and nearly arbi-
trary decision-making power to a board of directors86 who are to be
elected by shareholders, if any exist.87 The board of directors then
must, according to law, hire executive officers to manage the corpo-
ration's business operations.88 Directors' and executives' mandate is
broad, subject to some fiduciary duties that, for large part, are wai-
vable by shareholders and incorporators.89 Shareholders and direc-
tors alike may initiate major corporate transactions, like mergers,
liquidations, and buyouts, as well as changes to corporate legislation,
whether in statutory (bylaw) or constitutional (charter) form;9
many of which are subject to shareholder plebiscite91 and most of
8 See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATE LAW 10-11
(1999); see also Ciepley, supra note 47, at 144; Ripken, supra note 9, at 98.,
See generally FREDERIC MAITLAND, STATE, TRUST, AND CORPORATION (2003).
85 See, e.g., Limes, supra note 71, at 688; MARK V. NADEL, CORPORATIONS AND
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 205 (1976).
8 See 8 Del. C. § 141(a) (2014).
See 8 Del. C. 141(d) (2014).
See 8 Del. C. § 142(a) (2014).
See 8 Del. C. § 142(b)(7); see, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345
(Del. 1993) (articulating the "business judgment rule"); Strine, supra note 10, at
20 (noting that such discretion can be used to pursue activities not immediately
related to profit maximization).
' See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (vacated by Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d
1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011)) (stating shareholders may nominate directors); see also
17 C.F.R.§ 240.14a-8 (stating shareholders may make substantive proposals).
8 Del. C. §§ 242(b), 251(c) (2014). There is admittedly some inconsistency
here in the law, namely, with its granting to directors original, undelegated
power to manage the affairs of the business while also subjecting some of their
decisions and their selection for office to a shareholder vote. A partial resolu-
tion of this inconsistency is that (1) shareholders have no right to oversee day-
to-day operations; (2) a corporation need not have any shareholders, 8 Del. C. s
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which are subject to director veto.92 These actors, then, form the
source of the corporation's "general will," and they do so according
to the formula set out by law.
The theory deserves consideration. Notwithstanding the ar-
guments of the English pluralists, addressed below,9 3 it is certainly
true that. the law as a sociological fact shapes the relationships
among corporate group members and with "outsiders," who are of-
ten considered outsiders simply via the fiat of the law itself.9 Even
Gierke, the inspirational muse of past and present legal pluralists,
recognized as much.
However, the law defines, or at least sharply influences, the
corporate group's internal decision-making structures in a fashion
that often proves altogether undemocratic and inegalitarian.96 Alt-
hough other corporate group members may certainly influence the
corporation's legally mandated decision-making institution, they do
so usually at its behest and according to procedure's it establishes.97
The law understands their existence in corporate group as "outsid-
102(a)(4); (3) directors have a joint function, i.e., to manage the affairs of the
corporation while abiding by a separate and distinguishable fiduciary duty
owed to shareholders alone; and (4) explicitly granting shareholders original
power over corporate affairs might undermine their claim to limited liability.
See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in the "Anglo-American"
Corporation, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 579, 598 (2010); see also William T. Allen, Jack B.
Jacobs, & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate: A Mediation on Bridging
the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1067, 1072-73 (2002).
9 See 8 Del. C. §§ 242(a), 251 (2014).
9 See infra notes 121-124 and accompanying text.
9 ERIc W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONs: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 3 (2013) (applying
a neo-institutional ontology to the corporation, wherein the norms and incen-
tives provided by law shape corporate behavioral outcomes).
See GIERKE, supra note 79, at 30-31 (describing the impact of trade regulation
and property laws on the structure of both internal and external corporate rela-
tionships); see also JANET MCLEAN, SEARCHING FOR THE STATE IN BRITISH LEGAL
THOUGHT: COMPETING CONCEPTION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 82 (2012).
9 See generally Ciepley, supra note 47, at 147. Note, however, that a party might
glean some of the benefits associated with incorporation without incoporating
through private contracting, e.g., with indemnification agreements, insurance
contracts, waivers, and the like. Id.
97 PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 41-43 (1984)
(explaining corporation. intentions are formed by internal decision-making
structure).
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ers," individuals subject to the constraints provided in, ostensibly,
voluntary contractual relations with the fictive corporate person.
They are, in a word, invisible.98 Employees, large customers, credi-
tors, and other corporate stakeholders can create and enforce their
own "endogenous" rights against the corporate hierarchy only by
convincing that hierarchy to change its mind about things."
1. The Group Rights Implied by Concession Theory
Taken seriously, concession theory suggests that if a corpora-
tion possesses rights independent of its several members, the state
must directly grant those rights. Of course, American judicial -prece-
dent has, on occasion, enforced claims to religious freedom in the
context of corporate-group membership. The extent to which those
claims arose from individual interests alone or from those asserted
by a group as a unitary entity remains unclear. Moreover, the Court
has never explicitly granted free exercise rights to a corporate per-
son per se.1m Citizens United v. FEC10 leaves the matter unresolved,
as the Court's opinion addressed the protection of speech as such,
and any right held by a person-whether fictive or natural.102
2. The Illiberal Implications of Concession Theory
98 See MAITLAND,supra note 84, at 105 ("The judges in those courts [of litigation]
if I may so say, could only see the wall of trustees and could see nothing that lay
beyond it. Thus in a conflict with an external foe no question about personality
could arise.").
9 See Douglas Litowitz, The Corporation as God, 30 J. CORP. L. 501, 525 (2005)
(claiming that the corporation is not controlled by those most affected by it);
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 54, at 442 (discussing how non-shareholder
interests are protected through contract law and exogenous federal regulation).
100 See Gregory P. Magarian, Hobby Lobby in Constitutional Waters: Two Life
Rings and an Anchor, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANc 67, 71 (2014); see, e.g., Santa Clara
v. So. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 402-03 (1886) (granting a corporation proper-
ty rights based upon the individual property rights of the shareholders).
'0' 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
102 See Magarian, supra note 100, at 71-72.
Regardless, whether or not the state chooses to explicitly
grant religious rights to the fictive corporate person, concession the-
ories of corporate identity prove problematic for the application of
liberal rights.
First, and perhaps most importantly, concession theories im-
ply that only the state can legitimately grant rights to the corpora-
tion.10 3 To condition the existence of rights, however, on a political
determination by the state flies in the face of group rights dis-
course."' Rights are meant, after all, to protect citizens from state ac-
tions-whether those actions are taken through democratic proce-
dure or otherwise.05 To wait upon the state to grant rights is to
deprive rights of their normative meaning and purpose. It also grates
against the tradition in American political thought that views corpo-
rations as normatively meaningful private sector actors that not only
enable individual market freedoms, but also serve as a limiting pow-
er set against a potentially overreaching state.06
Regardless, even if the state should choose to grant rights to
the fictive corporate person, undoubtedly the rights enforced will re-
flect the preferences of the occupants of the upper echelons of cor-
porate management who, thanks to the state, have nearly absolute,
original, and arbitrary discretion to manage corporate affairs.0 7 Fur-
thermore, should the state refuse the corporation such rights, em-
ployees and others subject to the corporation's 'jurisdiction' will
nonetheless remain at the mercy of the religious preferences of a
corporate leadership0 8-at least unless (1) the state takes affirma-
103 JAMES A. GRAFF, Human Rights, Peoples, and the Right to Self-Determination, in
GROUP RIGHTS 194 (Judith Baker ed., 1994); see also Ciepley, supra note 47, at
139 (arguing that a rights-based rubric is not appropriate to the corporation
because of its governmental provenance).
10 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY Xi-Xii (1978).
o0 See id. at 192-97.
"0 See, e.g., ScoTT BOWMAN, THE CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 24-
25 (1996); WILLIAM G. Roy, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION 3-20 (1997).
107 See, e.g., Strine, supra note 10, at 259-60; Limes, supra note 71, at 687-88;
Chambers, supra note 43, at 1165.
108 Chambers, supra note 43, at 1165 ("An employer acts through its employees
and agents. Consequently, its religious rights will be protected and asserted by
employees and agents, including management. Functionally, how those rights
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tive steps to prevent it, or (2) the unlikely event that other corporate
group members amass enough socioeconomic power to influence
corporate decision-making using their own resources.
Specifically, shareholders, directors, and executives can as-
sert individual free exercise rights when they personally "exercise"
the functions of their offices.'" Other than the presence of some
light-touched, and often toothless,110 fiduciary duties owed to the
corporation and its stockholders, these individuals face the same,
sometimes insignificant, limitations on their free exercise rights as
anyone else. Yet, by virtue of their corporate office, they can fulfill
these rights armed with more resources than most other citizens can
claim."' When considered along with their de jure power over the
corporate group, the practice of executives' religion can amount to
religious legislation within the corporation.112 One can only wonder
just how far the business judgment rule might protect executives' re-
ligious practices against the claims and interests of others.
To illustrate, a CEO of a meat-packing company can exercise
her religious rights by refusing to interact with suppliers of non-
Kosher meat. She can also forbid employees from doing the same,
claiming that (1) to supervise such employees would further violate
her right; and (2) regardless, as CEO, she has the legal power to di-
rect employees pretty much how she likes,13 so long as she's abiding
by all applicable labor, safety, and environmental regulations. If em-
will be protected and asserted will depend on the religious prerogatives of
whatever decision maker is cloaked with the employer's power.").
10 Id.
110 See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 114 n.6 (Del.
Ch. 2009) (holding that Citibank directors and officers breached no fiduciary
duty, even though they bankrupted the company as a result of actions leading
up to the financial crisis).
1n See Ciepley, supra note 47, at 149-50.
112 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2804 (2014) (Gins-
berg, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 261 (1982)).
113 See, e.g., Bruner, supra note 91 at 600 (arguing that a team theory of corpora-
tion, in particular, gives directions so much discretion that they are free ignore
stakeholder interests, regardless of any social costs).
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ployees refuse, the CEO can fire them.114 Of course, those employees
might be able to assert a discrimination claim against the compa-
ny." 5 But given Supreme Court precedent, the chances of success on
such a claim are slim indeed. In 1987, the Court determined that a
corporation could indeed fire an employee for religious reasons.116
Indeed, one can even imagine a religious executive making a
colorable claim that the application of a fiduciary duty might place a.
substantial burden upon her free exercise rights. For example, a
shareholder might bring a claim for the breach of the fiduciary duty
df care against a CEO who refused to take out a loan needed to pre-
vent insolvency. That CEO, if her religion precluded the use of inter-
est, could claim that the enforcement of the law would substantially
burden her right to free exercise under the First Amendment. She.
should then be relieved of the burdensome imposition of fiduciary
law.
It is thus no accident that briefing associated with the Hobby
Lobby litigation focuses neurotically on the rights of the controlling
shareholders, whether in their individual capacity or in their capaci-
ty as staffers, funders and controllers of corporate offices, all the
while blinded to the impact those rights may have on employ-
ees-the individuals whom the contraceptive mandate seeks to pro-
tect.1 17 The reason is simple: The law affords employees no voice in
114 See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, In the Shadow of Globalization: Changing
Firm-Level Employment Practices and Shifting Economic Risks in the United
States, (U.C.L.A. L. Sch., L.-Econ. Res. Paper No. 07-13, 2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1023696 (arguing increased labor and product mar-
ket competition drives employers to seek "flexibility to hire and fire on [short]
notice" and to retain workers on an as-needed basis); see also Kent Greenfield,
Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. & PoL'Y REV. 1, 3-5
(2008).
115 See generally Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a)'s ministerial exemption
to an employee's discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq, against a church).
116 Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987).
117 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), passed by Congress in
2010, requires, among other provisions, employers' group health plans to fur-
nish preventive care and screenings for women without any cost sharing re-
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the formation of the corporate general will, no seat within the corpo-
rate halls of power. As a result, corporate stakeholders will face the
same coercive and exploitative circumstances attributable to the ag-
gregative ontology of the corporation.
C. The Real Entity Theory of Corporation
The real entity theory of the corporate group recognizes that
despite its promulgation of corporate law, the state "[can]not com-
pletely destroy the inner community life, the comradely together-
ness, the corporate spirit .. . communities continue[] a vigorous se-
cret existence, expressed in assemblies, secret agreements,
banqueting, the exercise of authority and the execution of disobedi-
ent members."'18 Corporations are not mere aggregations of individ-
uals, nor are they creations of the state. Rather, for a real entity theo-
rist, corporations "exist by some inward living force, with powers of
self-development like a person ...... 119 And they develop "out of the
natural associative instincts of mankind."1 20 A real conception of cor-
poration, however, need not invoke any transcendental metaphys-
ics. 12 1 A team of oxen, for example, appears qualitatively different
than each animal on its own, but it is not thereby rendered into some
new fantastical two-headed beast.12 2 The pluralists typically under-
stand the state as but one corporate group among many, often en-
quirements, including coverage for the 20 contraceptive methods approved by
the Food and Drug administration. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751.
"1 OTTo VON GIERKE, COMMUNITY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 130 (1990).
"1 JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, CHURCHES IN THE MODERN STATE 40 (1914) (discussing
churches as independent entities); see also Ripken, supra note 9, at 141;
MCLEAN, supra note 95, at 71.
120 FIGGIS, supra note 119, at 47-48.
121 Vernon Van Dyke, Collective Entities and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal-
Democratic Thought, 44 J. PoL. 21, 22 (1982).
m PAUL Q. HIRST, Introduction to THE PLURALIST THEORY OF THE STATE 20-21 (Paul
Q. Hirst ed., 1989); see also LIST & PETTIT, supra note 25, at 75 (finding a non-
mystical group autonomy).
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compassing all the rest like nesting concentric circles.123 For plural-
ists, laws that address associations do not mean to define or to cre-
ate them, but merely to serve as prudential tools to manage, piece-
meal, disputes between the association and outsiders.124
Such real entities, developing without any vivifying power of
law, will exhibit a diverse array of internal governance procedures
and relationships. For example, Gierke, in Community in Historical
Perspective, identifies two ideal types of corporation, each tracing its
roots to medieval Europe: one of voluntary fellowship and one of
imposed lordship.125 In regards to business corporations, Gierke lo-
cates their origins in fellowship, to communal or jointly held proper-
ty around which emerged cooperative communities.126 Members of
these communities often pursued their own diverse goals, failing to
yield to any comprehensive corporate purpose beyond the mainte-
nance of the commonly held property.12 7 Each member remained her
own master; she was both worker and joint owner.
Such economic cooperatives, however, did not last through
the emergence of the modern economy. Gierke, speaking provoca-
tively, argued that "[t]he lordship of capital [Kapitalsherrschaft] cre-
ated a new form of lordship group, based on capital, in the relation-
ship between the entrepreneur and the employees."28 Unlike the
more communal fellowship, modern corporate leadership sets
group priorities and directs the activities of corporate members.
Individuals do not come into the group free to use corporate
property as they like; they may only use it in accordance with the
direction of corporate owners. In the words of Gierke, "if [the busi-
1 FIGGIS, supra note 118 at 70; GIERKE, supra note 118, at 162-63; but see G.D.H.
Cole, Coercion and Co-Ordination, in THE PLURALIST THEORY OF THE STATE (Paul Q.
Hirst ed., 1989).
124 See MAITLAND, supra note 84, at xxiv, xxxiii, 103-05; P.Q. HIRST, Introduction,
in THE PLURALIST THEORY OF THE STATE (Paul Q. Hirst ed., 1989).
'2 GIERKE, supra note 118, at 17-20.
126 Id. at 221.
121 Id. at 185.
128 Id. at 188.
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ness corporation] alone ruled, it would lead to the despotism of capi-
tal."1 29
The ends pursued by these new corporate entities (i.e., prof-
it) usually favor the privileged participants, the contributors of capi-
tal, and their (contractual or hereditary) descendants.130 If any vol-
untary association was implicated, it was a voluntary association
among those contributors. They could form an "association of prop-
erty" that strung the individual donors together through their per-
sonal interest in and legal claims to their property contributions.131
In regards to the formation of the corporate "general will," Gierke
argues that a unique and autonomous corporate personality arises
from donors' subjective interests in their property:
Capital, which has been set aside for a specific pur-
pose, self-contained, is in itself lifeless and motion-
less. It can be imbued with vitality and direction
solely and exclusively by a personality. Such a per-
sonality can be an individual, several individuals
bound by a contract, the state, a local community or
any volitional personal collective organism; or again
an institutional personality ... It is of course true that
the members of the association are members with
only a part of their property personality, but still with
a part of their personality! But, if the elements from
which the whole is constructed are partial personali-
ties, and if, because it is organized, the whole is inter-
nally and externally an independent entity distinct
from the sum total of its parts then this entity, too, is
a personality . . . . Collective will brings the corpora-
tion into existence by a constitutive act (which has
been falsely constructed as a contract ... ) and in the
articles.132
129 Id. at 204; see also NORBERTO BOBBIO, THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY: A DEFENSE OF
THE RULES OFTHE GAME 57 (1987).
130 GIERKEsupra note 118, at 190, 197.
131 Id. at 197.
132 GIERKE, supra note 118, at 198.
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Such metaphysics should not be consigned to the historical dustbin.
More recently, Peter French, in Collective and Corporate Responsibil-
ity, elaborates Gierke's formulation by describing the formation of a
corporate will with reference to internal decision-making structures,
informal hierarchies, corporate cultures, and substantive policies es-
tablished through past corporate action.133 List and Pettit, in their
important 2011 work, likewise derive an autonomous group agency
that cannot be attributed to a simple aggregation of individual inter-
ests.134
Indeed, closely-held, family-owned companies like Hobby
Lobby may still derive much of the content of their zweck from what
Gierke calls "several individuals bound by a contract,"3 5 and they
may contain perhaps greater parts of the individuals' personali-
ties-much akin to a partnership.'3 6 It thus remains a possibility that
these individuals would form a unitary general will that occasionally
deviates from the pursuit of profit, depending upon their unique in-
dividual personalities. Corporate ends could be religious, environ-
mentally conscious, socially responsible, or otherwise.'3 Public
133 FRENCH, supra note 97, at 41-50 (resting on a Kelsenian idea of a "founda-
tional rule of recognition" that is invoked to discriminate between decisions
made that can properly attributed to the corporation per se, and which are "ul-
tra vires."); see generally JOSHUA BARKAN, CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND
GOVERNMENT UNDER CAPITALISM (2013).
13 LIST & PETTIT, supra note 25, at 44.
135 GIERKE,supra note 118, at 198.
136 See 8 Del. C. §§ 341-51 (2014) (pertaining to close corporations). The corpo-
rate law governing close corporations sometimes echo those regulating part-
nerships. For example, shareholders can take on management duties and can
restrict the otherwise nearly unlimited discretion of boards of directors 8 Del. C.
§§ 350-51 (2014): If Gierke is correct, such laws merely codify "real" relation-
ships. See GIERKE, supra note 118, at 198. At least in Delaware, the laws on close
corporations were a legislative response to judicial common law precedent set-
tling equity claims with reference to partnership law because such companies
were, in fact, run like partnerships. Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close Corpora-
tion and the Making of Corporation Law, 5 BERKELEY Bus. L. J. 263, 293 (2008).
Needless to say, limited liability still holds. However, because of the more inti-
mate involvement of stockholders, it may be easier to make a case to "pierce the
corporate veil" by asserting an alter-ego theory based upon the commingling of
funds, records, and purposes.
m GIERKE, supra note 118, at 203; Strine, supra note 10, at 33. For example, if
the Court decides that the corporate veil sufficiently separates the corporation
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companies, however, arguably animate their capital through a socio-
pathic "institutional personality" set by capital markets.138 The "per-
sonality" of these companies' dispersed, anonymous, largely apathet-
ic and lightly-invested shareholders is presumed and pre-defined by
market dynamics, statute, and judicial precedent.3 9 In fact, many
shareholders, e.g., those who passively invest in managed 401Ks,
cannot even identify the companies in which they invest.14 Conse-
quently, the direction of a corporation's authoritative relationship
over employees now derives not from the collective will of share-
holders, but instead from salaried executives incentivized not only
by their personal preferences, but also by financial market pressures
to maximize shareholder value at almost all costs.14' The quarterly
reporting requirements of the securities laws only exacerbate these
pressures.142
Yet despite the politically relevant impact of such authorita-
tive relationships--whether between capital holder and worker or
between executive and worker--the state and its laws treat such
from its shareholders so as to repel any imposition of shareholders' religious
practices, that same veil might also be used to repel shareholders' views regard-
ing environmentalism, fair wages, diversity, and other salutary goals. See gen-
erally Strine, supra note 10, at 28-30 (compelling description of the anti-social
results of a corporate general will, informed by mobile capital, institutional in-
vestors, and technology, that focuses psychopathically on short-term profit).
Strine, the sitting Chancellor on the Delaware Court of Chancery, is not hopeful
about the state's ability to regulate the worst of the damage wrought.
138 By this I mean that competitive capital markets, such as those found on pub-
lic exchanges like the NYSE, create economic pressures for corporate manage-
ment to churn out as much profit as quickly as possible, lest they be subject to
hostile takeovers from leveraged buy-out shops like Bain Capital. I would note
that this particular understanding comports much more closely with Marxian
ideas. See Strine, supra note 10, at 28-29 (giving a colorful description of this
phenomenon in the context of globalization).
.3. See generally R.B. DAVIS, DEMOCRATIZING PENSION FUNDS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2008) (making a case for democratizing institutional inves-
tors so as to bring more of their "personality" into the firm); FRENCH, supra note
97, at 45; HIRST, supra note 124, at 19-20; Strine, supra note 10, at 31-32.
140 Strine, supra note 10, at 32.
141 Id. at 29.
142 ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932); Strine, supra note 10, at 13, 32-33.
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communities as private, hidden behind the legal status of corporate
personhood.143 Gierke went so far as to claim that "neither scholar-
ship nor the law had any creative role in this: but they were forced to
recognise what the autonomy of associating groups had created,"
and, once recognized, left them pretty much to their own devices.1"
Meanwhile, corporate norms, codified in bylaws and charters, bind
the membership stronger than any law ever could.145
It is perhaps the real entity theory of the corporation that
lurks behind the Court's opinion in Hobby Lobby. First, this concep-
tual schematic could explain why the Court cites stockholders' indi-
vidual religious beliefs as evidence of the corporate religion, yet ne-
glects to consider the individual rights of all corporate
stakeholders-despite its earlier contention that such rights ought to
represent those of employees as well as those of officers and share-
holders.'" Rather, it seems more like the Court determined the cor-
porate religious "zweck" by referencing (1) the statements of official
spokespersonsl47 acting as representatives of a real entity as well as
(2) the text of the entities' governing documents.148 Second, it is why,
perhaps, the Court appears to disregard the corporate veil that tradi-
tionally separates the identity and claims of individual corporate
members from those of the corporation as a whole.149 For if individu-
al stockholders can project onto the corporation their individual
claims for religious rights, it is not at all clear why they cannot also
project their personal liabilities. This makes sense only if the Court
assigned to the petitioner corporations an autonomous moral exist-
ence. And finally, it is maybe why the Court invoked the Dictionary
Act-a statute---to afford Constitutional protection to "autonomous"
143 BARKAN, supra note 133, at 6 (describing corporate sovereignty, understood
in terms of Agamben's "ban," that carves out spheres of jurisdiction for corpora-
tions to go largely ignored by the state.); GIERKE, supra note 118, at 197, 201;
MAITLAND, supra note 84, at 95-96.
1 GIERKE, supra note 118, at 197.
145Id. at 197-98.
14 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
147 Id., at 2764-66.
"n Id. at 2764, 2766.
149 See generally, Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Support of
Petitioners, as Amici Curiae, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-536).
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corporate organizations. 150 For if the Court had really embraced an
aggregative ontology of corporation when asserting that apart from
human beings, a corporation has no rights at all, it is not at all clear
why it would search statutory law to find a reason to do so anyway.
1. The Group Rights Implied by Real Entity Theory
The real entity theories of corporation, like those described
by the English pluralists, imply a corporate group right that does not
ultimately derive from the moral status of individual members."s'
The upside of this theory is that it takes into account a group's cul-
tural and relational characteristics that collective rights concepts
might neglect in the process of aggregating individual interests.15
For example, fellowship communities, based upon voluntary associa-
tion, do not overlap perfectly with nexus-of-contract heories of cor-
porations precisely because they recognize the unique organization-
al dynamics, identities, solidarities, and informal relationships that
atomistic views of corporations ignore.15 3 Moreover, the group need
not abide by liberal, Rawlsian comprehensive views1 54 and so at least
appears to cohere better in societies exhibiting a plurality of value
systems. A corporation need not, for example, heed the rights of ma-
jorities, minorities, and single individuals because it does not derive
from individual member rights.155 It therefore might elide the prob-
"so Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (quoting 1 U. S. C. §1).
'5' See JONES, supra note 24, at 80-81, 94-96.
152 See infra notes 159-61.
153 This point is controversial. For example, formal modeling in the social sci-
ences explain the development of norms, institutions, and strategies in terms of
prisoner's dilemmas, bargaining, and collective action. See generally ORTS, supra
note 94, (providing such a framework in the context of business corporations).
The focus of such coordinated action might even be fairly described as serving
as a group "general will," though unlike Rousseau's version, it relies upon the
interaction of individual preferences.
See generally JOHN RAwLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996).
15 Kukathas, supra note 38, at 113 ("The more important conflict of interest
within groups, however, is that between the masses and elites. This conflict is
starkly revealed within ethnic cultural communities confronted by moderniza-
tion.").
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lems of democratic interest aggregation implied by aggregative theo-
ries of the corporation.15 6 The real entity group right likewise
acknowledges that the rights of groups might remain in existence
long after individual members come and go, better reflecting reality
than collective rights conceptions.15 7 Finally, if a group has autono-
mous moral standing, it serves as a repository not only for rights, but
also for duties. Group rights theories therefore permit the allocation
of blame to corporations for actions that harm others, even when
blame cannot be directly traced to the actions of individual mem-
bers.'
Often, supporters of a real entity group right justify the right
because the group exhibits attributes similar to those of human be-
ings. As such, groups will merit rights based upon those attributes,
just as human beings do. For many scholars, those rights are at least
coeval with those of individuals. For example, Peter French argues
that groups can form an intentionality to their actions in the same
kind of way that human beings can.159 Such intentionality arises sep-
arate from the actual intents of the individuals involved in forming it.
Accordingly, they can be held to account for their actions. And they
can be said to have a moral interest in achieving the object of their
intent.
1s6 See id. at 114 (embracing a "real entity" group right permits one, wrongfully,
to elide the problem of "minorities within minorities").
17 See id. at 113 ("[I]t is important to note not only that group composition
changes over time but that most groups are not homogenous at any given mo-
ment").
1ss FRENCH, supra note 15, at 167 (developing a principle of responsible
adjustment that can be applied to corporate decision-making structures and
which justifies holding corporations morally accountable). This conundrum
might be the obstacle holding up prosecutions in connection with the financial
crisis. Collective corporate neglect, greed, and dishonesty can be blamed for the
meltdown, but no one banker, individually, can be said to have acted with the
requisite intent to harm, nor can her contribution to the harm caused be quanti-
fied. For a more detailed discussion on corporate responsibility, see id.; Ripken,
supra note 9, at 100-01; JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS 363-66 (1993); LIST &
PETTIT, supra note 25, at 154.
15 FRENCH, supra note 15, at 164-69 (invoking the notion of a Wittgensteinian
grammar, French argues that corporate intentionality is formed through inter-
nal decision-making structures just as biological human beings form intentions
through linguistic rules).
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However, "[t]he process of analogizing about the liabilities of
corporations from the liabilities of individuals does not yield eternal
or universal truths about identity - it is simply an analogy which
should be evaluated against an independent standard of justice."16
That groups may exhibit some of the characteristics of individuals
does not mean that they merit the same treatment as individuals in
all circumstances.1 61 After all, if a business corporation mindlessly
pursues profits at all costs and without either question or reflection,
the only individual to whom one can realistically compare it would
be, truly, sociopathic.162 Whether such an individual merits a full
complement of rights is certainly open to debate.
2. The Illiberal Implications of Real Entity Theory
The assignment of original rights to groups implies that their
members have a moral duty to make good on them.163 It means the
group as a whole may make rights-based claims upon its own mem-
bership who must, to respect those rights, obey.M Given the inde-
terminateness of the corporate will, 65 and the possibility that elites
160 MCLEAN, supra note 95, at 81; see also David Estlund, The Democra-
cy/Contractualism Analogy, 31 PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 387, 390 (analogiz-
ing between actual democratic procedures and a Rawlsian contractual theory of
justice).
161 See MCLEAN, supra note 95, at 85; Waldron, supra note 74, at 205. Ripken ad-
mits "the possibility that both human and corporation qualify as moral agents"
but argues that doing so does not require one to "refuse to reduce each agency
to a common denominator," i.e., a human personality. Ripken, supra note 9, at
130 (quoting Thomas Donaldson, Personalizing Corporate Ontology: The French
Way, in SHAME, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CORPORATION (Hugh Curtler ed., 1986)).
162 Ripken, supra note 9, at 119.
163 Waldron, supra note 74, at 212.
'6 Waldron, supra note 74, at 205; but see WILL KYMLICKA, THE POLITICS OF
MULTICULTURALISM, Ch. 2 (2003) (distinguishing between internal and external
protections for group rights).
1 MCLEAN, supra note 95, at 78; Alan E. Garfield, The Contraception Mandate
Debate: Achieving a Sensible Balance, 114 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 10-11 (2014).
Garfield addresses the problem of identifying a precise collective "will" in re-
gards to religious exercise in the context of a corporation:
407
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
can usurp the job of forming it, real entity theory presents several
dilemmas in regards to individual rights.
First, a group's ostensibly natural hierarchical power struc-
ture may possess a monopoly on the formation of group personality
and, therefore, the rights claimed by the group.'" It might therefore
violate the individual rights and liberties of group members who
have no role in the formation of the group personality and so may
disagree with its dictates.167 Moreover, group identities change over
time.'6 Its members come and go, along with their individual inter-
ests and values. Assigning rights to the group as such, therefore, may
inappropriately empower status-quo group leadership at the ex-
pense of actual values and goals of present and future members.169
Second, and similar to the aggregation issues mentioned
above, the majority consensus in ostensibly democratic "real" groups
might silence the unique voices of its members, much as Rousseau's
general will threatens to suffocate citizens' individual interests and
opinions.170 For example, a youth athletic league, as a group, may
claim an original right to include and exclude members based upon
its internal values, just as a person may claim an original right to as-
sociate with whom she likes.17 ' Imagine that an internal group deci-
But even if one assumes that [a corporation can exercise reli-
gion], there is still the question of how a court can identify a
for-profit corporation's religious beliefs. Does it look to the
corporation's charter or bylaws? Can only a small, privately-
held family corporation have religious beliefs, or can a large,
publicly held company? Does the Board of Directors, the CEO,
or the shareholders holding a majority of the stock decide
what the corporation's religious values are?"
Id.
16 Kukathas, supra note 38, at 114.
Waldron, supra note 74, at 209-10.
'6 Kukathas, supra note 38, at 110-11.
6 Id. at 114.
170 For an elegant derivation of institutional rules that might yield a "general
will" without implicating the violation of minority liberties, see Melissa
Schwartzberg, Voting the General Will: Rousseau on Decision Rules, 36 PoL.
THEORY, 403-23 (2008).
171 See Kukathas, supra note 38, at 112 ("[T]here appears to be good reason to
recognize the right of groups to guard themselves against the intrusions of the
outside world and to determine their own destiny.").
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sion-making apparatus-whether an elite hierarchy or a majority of
members-determines that all children must attend a group-run re-
ligious school and that they will banish from their community any
who instead choose a state-run public school.172 Though many chil-
dren and parents may have had no say in the matter, they neverthe-
less have a corresponding duty to comply with the mandate by either
attending the religious school or by leaving the community. To the
extent that such children and parents might otherwise claim a right
to remain participants in the community despite choosing a public
school, for example, because the threat of expulsion constitutes an
unconstitutional deprivation of educational equality,73 the enforce-
ment of the group right yields an illiberal outcome.
Exacerbating these problems, pluralists, by investing such
groups with a kind of sovereign autonomy, would deprive group
members of protections that the state might offer.174 As a matter of
reality, large corporations possess "functions and powers that are
traditionally associated with the state, making corporations compa-
rable to sovereign government-like bureaucracies."'75 Real entity
172 This illustration is inspired by recent events in Williamsburg, Brooklyn. See
Gary Buiso, Ads Highlight Poor Secular Education at Orthodox Jewish Schools,
N.Y. PosT, Feb. 22, 2015, http://nypostcom/2015/02/22/ads-highlight-poor-
secular-education-at-orthodox-jewish-schools/.
173 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
174 See BRKAN, supra note 133, at 20-21 (explaining that the incorporation of
society implies that the law abandons corporate members, leaving them under
the jurisdiction of the corporation instead); FIGGIS, supra note 119, at 102.
Though Figgis recognizes that some corporations are quite powerful, and so
merit more regulation than individuals, he also states "no power -- not even a
religious society -- is absolute, but in the last resort his allegiance to his own
conscience is final." Id at 154.
175 Ripken, supra note 9, at 142; see also Strine, supra note 10, at 42 (discussing
how the exertion of state sovereignty over multinational coporations is
"ludicrous" without a concerted, global effort, given the size and power of these
corporations and the securities markets); see generally Elizabeth A. Clark,




theorists would add, however, that it ought to be just so.'76 For many
pluralists, corporations and other human associations are, or should
be, the constituent powers of the modern state.17 7 The celebrated le-
gal historian F.W. Maitland, for one, believes -that "the thought of a
'jurisdiction' inherent in the Genossenschaft is strong in us," 78 while
Figgis, a great defender of corporate religious rights, spent an entire
chapter in his Churches. in the Modern State railing against an osten-
sibly authoritarian ultramontanism, namely, the location of political
power exclusively within a single state organ.179 For these authors,
the group is "prior" to the polity. Accordingly, the state is legitimate
only insofar as it protects and respects groups.
The upshot, should these authors have their druthers: Mem-
bers whose own rights have been harmed by corporate action will
have no appeal. In any conflict between an asserted group right and
an individual right, the individual may very well find herself without
recourse because the state would be duty bound to protect the
group.
Ill. VOLUNTARINESS AND TOLERATION: FORMING A BRIDGE ACROSS THE
GROUP RIGHTS THICKET
As shown above, different legal theories of the corporation
suggest different kinds of group rights that can be attributed to cor-
porate religious practice. Unfortunately, none adequately assure the
protection of their members' individual liberties, especially when
groups are characterized by authoritarian, undemocratic, and hier-
archical internal power structures. After all, "[e]very association, by
176 See CARL SCHMITT, The Ethic of State and the Pluralistic State, in THE CHALLENGE
OF CARL SCHMITT 187-88 (Chantal Mouffe, ed., 1999); Figgis, supra note 119, at
41-42.
17 See e.g., Cole, supra note 123; MCLEAN, supra note 95, at 75; THOMAS H. GREEN,
LECTURES ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION 139 (1967) ("A state presup-
poses other forms of community, with the rights that arise out of them, and only
exists as a sustaining, securing, and completing them.").
17 MAITLAND, supra note 84, at 106.
17 John Neville Figgis, "Lecture IV: Ultramontansim," in Churches in the Modern
State, 135 etseq.
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the mere fact of its existence, is endowed with some coercive power,
and actually exercises some such power."180 It is here that political
theory, dedicated as it is to the justification of power, may provide
the law with some guidance.
Addressing how one might go about constraining the power
of groups should not prove overly controversial for many.181 Certain-
ly, the group rights associated with aggregate theories of corporation
purport, in the first instance, to express certain individual rights that
cannot be adequately protected in a more ontologically atomistic lib-
eral framework., And Justice Ginsberg, in her Hobby Lobby dissent,
perhaps invoked a concession theory to argue in defense of individu-
al worker rights to reproductive healthcare.82 The presence of such
coercion, therefore, will concern advocates of these conceptions of
rights. In addition, though for many pluralists group rights are origi-
nal, at least some recognize the importance of respecting the indi-
vidual.183 The pluralists valued group freedom, after all, because they
understood groups as serving emancipatory purposes.1" Therefore,
180 Cole, supra note 123, at 98.
181 Of course, critics assert that liberalism's emphasis on the moral primacy on
the individual "presupposes ome view of society and community" that might
not be shared by everyone. Kukathas, supra note 38, at 108. Contemporary crit-
ical theorists like Rainer Forst, however, counter by arguing in favor of a proce-
dural theory of rights that purports to transcend cultural borders. See, e.g.,
Rainer Forst, The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justifica-
tion: a Reflexive Approach, 10 ETHICS 711, 711-40 (2010). It is not my intent,
needless to say, to try to resolve this debate here.
182 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct 2751, 2794, 2799 (reciting the
concession theory as articulated in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) and noting that the corporation is a creation of law
while also noting that the government chose to further the public interest by
mandating healthcare benefits via law).
m FIGGIS, supra note 119, at 100 ("[F]alse conception of the state as the only
true political entity apart from the individual is at variance not only with eccle-
siastical liberty, but with the freedom of all other communal life, and ultimately
with that of the individual.") (emphasis added).
1 See, e.g., McLEAN, supra note 95, at 78-79 (discussing the view of group
associations such as churches and trade unions as "bulwarks against the
soverign state"); MAITLAND, supra note 84, at xix; Ripken, supra note 9, at 142-
43.
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because "[i]ndividuals arguably can be victims of corporate oppres-
sion as easily as victims of state oppression,"185 even a pluralist sure-
ly would concern herself with individual rights in group context.
Several political theoretical concepts may ease the tension
created by this group/individual antagonism. Specifically, the appli-
cation of the principles of voluntariness and toleration can mitigate
some of the conflicts arising from the joint application of group and
individual rights. Under liberal democratic theory, founded often on
methodologically individualistic ideas of social contract, the legiti-
macy of power derives from consent of the individuals governed.86
Consent, however, need not always come in the form of democratic
18718participation, or voice. It can also come from free entry and exit.8
Because, individuals can choose to leave groups in many cases, the
necessity of active democratic participation in lawmaking lessens.8
Thus, one might also elide the conundrums presented by the pro-
spect of aggregating individual interests. As an alternative, embrac-
ing a right and duty of toleration can act as a constraint on illiberal
applications of group power.'9
A. Voluntariness
Liberal theories justify state power over individuals by refer-
ence to individual consent. Locke, for example, famously deduced
government powers to protect the life, liberty, and property of per-
sons based upon a unanimous social contract that is expressly re-
newed every time anyone accepts an inheritance.191 Many view rep-
185 Ripken, supra note 9, at 142-43.
8 E.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT Ch. VI § 73, 315 (Peter
Laslett ed., 1988) (1714) ("For every Man's Children being by Nature as free as
himself, or any of his Ancestors ever were, may, whilst they are in that Freedom,
choose what Society they will join themselves to, what Common-wealth they
will put themselves under.").
18 See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES To DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1970) (applied to European Union in J.H.H.
Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991)).
In Id.
189 Id. at 33-34.
190 Discussed infra at IV.
191. LOCKE, supra note 186, at 348-49.
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resentative democracy as helping to renew and extend that consent
through the use of delegates or trustees.192 For under liberal ideas,
"no man [should] have a legislator imposed upon him but whom [he]
himself has chosen."1 93 Simply stated, to ensure that government
represents policies that people accept, people must somehow exer-
cise their "voice" to express and agree upon preferences. And it is on-
ly those preferences that may be translated into binding authority.
If Maitland is correct, if the state is just another "species" of
the same group "genus," the same liberal democratic principles
ought to apply to groups.'9 Even Figgis thought the Church ought to
exist as a "great democracy,"1 95 though he was perhaps a bit too san-
guine about the laity's ability to influence ecclesiastical eadership.
But unlike a state, under whose jurisdiction individuals must
submit whether they like it or not, groups need not compel others'
membership. Members can avoid laws they do not like simply by
leaving the organization. To illustrate, Locke, in his Letter Concerning
Toleration, presumed the voluntariness of participation in religious
organization.1 9 Members exercised their full and free consent to
governance by staying, their dissatisfaction, simply by leaving:
For, if afterwards, he discover any thing either
erroneous in the doctrine, or incongruous in the
worship of that society to which he has joined
himself, why should it not be as free for him to
go out as it was to enter? . . . But since the join-
ing together of several members into this
church-society, as has already been demon-
strated, is absolutely free and spontaneous, it
192 See generally HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
193 See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION IN Focus 21 (John Horton &
Susan Mendus eds., 1991) (1689).
194 See MAITLAND, supra note 84, at 106.
195 FIGGIs, supra note 119, at 155.
LOCKE, supra note 193, at 20 ("A church then I take to be a voluntary society
of men, joining themselves together of their own accord in order to the public
worshipping of God, in such a manner as they judge acceptable to him, and ef-
fectual to the salvation of their souls. I say, it is a free and voluntary society. No-
body is born a member of any church....").
413
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
necessarily follows that the right of making its
laws can belong to none but the society itself, or
at least which is the same thing, to those whom
the society by common consent has authorized
thereunto.197
As a result, the leaders of a religious group need not attend so closely
to the preferences of its members. Should those members confront
law to which they do not consent, they can protect themselves with
their exit option.198
Consent, thus understood as either exit or voice,19 or what I
call here "voluntariness," already exists to some degree in the corpo-
rate context. However, under contemporary circumstances, the dis-
tribution of access to voluntariness is anything but equal. For exam-
ple, shareholders exercise their voice by electing directors,
approving major corporate transactions, and proposing and voting
on corporate "legislation." Meanwhile, they generally benefit from
low exit costs. If a corporation attempts to pursue religious policies
they reject, they can take a Wall Street walk, i.e., sell their shares.200
They can further mitigate their exit costs by diversifying their in-
vestments. In this way, shareholders need not remain beholden to
any particular corporation for their future income and, therefore,
need not feel stuck investing in a company whose religious practices
they disapprove. Unlike shareholders, however, employees rarely
have the time and resources to diversify their employment. Addi-
tionally, as explained above, they have limited, if any, "voice" in cor-
porate governance.201
Whether, and to what extent, the presence of an exit option
will satisfactorily proxy consent to corporate authority will, of
course, depend on factual circumstances-including circumstances
197 Id
198 See SHAPIRO, supra note 43, at 34-35 (arguing that democratic rights need not
apply so stringently in situations where exit from regulation is available).
' See, e.g., Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403
(1991); HIRSCHMAN, supra note 187 (arguing that when members of a group
cannot easily exit they will demand more "voice," or more influence over policy-
making).
200 See SHAPIRO, supra note 43, at 166-67.
201 Id.
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beyond the corporation's control. Yet although corporate leadership
may not create the tight labor markets that render employee exit
costly, they cannot evade this understanding of liberal justice. For
our liberal values can only justify an antidemocratic governance
structure upon either uncoerced consent or the availability of free
and seamless exit. Indeed, free exit is absolutely required if groups
wish to enforce rules that violate higher order. liberal principles like,
e.g., harm principles.
B. Toleration
Free exit is perhaps an ideal never to be achieved in less than
perfectly competitive markets. Voice, at the same time, may not pro-
vide a convincing framework to resolve issues of non-consent to
corporate religious exercise. For reasons set forth above in Part Ill,
finding a unanimous "voice" among a group of distinct individuals is
itself an ideal unlikely to see the light of day. Fortunately, liberalism
not only protects individuals via the democratic procedures of exit
and voice, but it also protects them by affording them a right to tol-
eration. Thus, when exit and voice alike prove impracticable, the
right to toleration, i.e., to tolerate members' divergent interests de-
spite the majoritarian will of the group, is appropriate.
The concept of toleration has many forms. 20 3 Here, I will pre-
sent two as possible tools that can help resolve the question of cor-
porate religious exercise. First, John Locke gives both an epistemic
and political argument for toleration as non-coercion, one shared in
part by Figgis-at least when it comes to the treatment of outsid-
ers.204 Epistemic, because faith cannot be forced, and so using coer-
202 See also Stephen Biggs, Liberalism, Feminism, and Group Rights, 95 MONIST 72,
72-85 (2012) (arguing this schematic does not resolve issues arising from
"false consciousness," or when people ostensibly freely choose to undergo what
outsiders would consider harms or infringements of liberty); see generally
MARCI A. HAMILTON, supra note 2.
203 See generally RAINER FORST, TOLERATION IN CONFLICT (2013) (providing a con-
ceptual history of toleration in the West).
204 FIGGIS, supra note 119, at 116-17, 125.
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cion to convert others is futile business indeed.205 Regardless, for
Locke, God commands us to. convert by love and not with the
sword.20 Politically, Locke argues that tolerance is required because
government, whose sole purpose is to protect people and their prop-
erty,207 cannot harm its citizens without their consent.20 8 Instead, the
state should leave individuals free to pursue their own interest and
their own conception of the good life.20 Moreover, Locke advocates
tolerance as among different religions, because for him, no qualified
judges of the true faith walk the earth.2 10 Locke's concept of tolera-
tion might thus forbid corporate leadership from "coercing" employ-
ees into obeying religious tenets by, for example, threatening them
205 See FORST, TOLERATION IN CONFLICT, supra note 203, at 215-18.
206 LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, supra note 65, at 16 ("If any one main-
tain that men ought to be compelled by fire and sword to profess certain doc-
trines, and conform to this or that exterior worship, without any regard had un-
to their morals; if any one endeavour to convert those that are erroneous unto
the faith, by forcing them to profess things that they do not believe, and allow-
ing them to practise things that the Gospel does not permit; it cannot be doubt-
ed, indeed, that such a one is desirous to have a numerous assembly joined in
the same profession with himself; but that he principally intends by those
means to compose a truly Christian church, is altogether incredible.").
207 LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 186, at § 94.
208 LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration,'supra note 65, at 174 ("It is the duty of
the civil magistrate, by the impartial execution of equal laws, to secure unto all
the people in general and to every one of his subjects in particular the just pos-
session of these things belonging to this life. If anyone presume to violate the
laws of public justice and equity, established for the preservation of those
things, his presumption is to be checked by the fear of punishment, consisting in
the deprivation or diminution of those civil interests, or goods, which otherwise
he might and ought o enjoy. But seeing no man does willingly suffer himself to
be punished by the deprivation of any part of his goods, and much less of his
liberty or life, therefore, is the magistrate armed with the force and strength of
all his subjects, in order to the punishment of those that violate any other man's
rights."); LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 186, at 355-56; JOHN
LOCKE, An Essay Concerning Toleration, in AN ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION AND
OTHER WRITINGS ON LAW AND POLITICS 269, 270 U.R. Milton & Philip Milton eds.,
2006) (While there can be no agreement about religion, the magistrate's duty to
protect people from harm "is a rule so certain and so clear that he can scarce err
in it, unless he do it willfully."); see FORST, TOLERATION IN CONFLICT, supra note
203, at 230-31.209 See FORST, TOLERATION IN CONFLICT, supra note 203, at 215-16.
20 Id. at 221.
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with discharge or by offering them a Hobson's choice between em-
ployment and access to religiously proscribed medication. Regard-
less, Locke's solution may be not acceptable to modern day liberal
democracies because it is based on an avowedly religious authority:
natural law and, through natural law, God.211
Second, Philosopher Rainer Forst develops a more secular
view of toleration based on a foundational moral norm consisting of
respect for others.2 12 On applying both deductive and critical-
historical argument, Forst concludes that respect for others necessi-
tates the practice of reciprocity and justification.2 13 Forst would thus
allow a person "to live in accordance with his or her convictions and
if necessary canvass for them, but he or she will not impose them on
others who can reject these convictions on reciprocal and general
grounds.2 14 Specifically, reciprocity forbids people from making cer
tain claims that they would deny others. It also forbids them from
claiming to speak in others' "real" interests by, e.g., asserting values
they think others ought to have. And like Locke, Forst forbids appeal
to a "higher truth"--at least unless it can meet with approval or con-
sent that is given freely by all, based upon justifications all can and
do reasonably accept.215 For example, with regards to abortion
rights, Forst argues that:
[N]either of the two sides to such a dispute can justi-
fiably claim that their conception should be made the
basis of generally binding coercive norms. It is pre-
211 Id. at 223 (stating that Locke's argument for toleration did not include tolera-
tion for atheists and presupposed a civic culture founded upon basic Christian
principles).
212 Id. at 459-60. Note that morality and ethics serve two different purposes in
Forst's argument. Moral norms enjoy a lexical priority over ethics: "particular
ethical convictions meet with objections which explain why these convictions
can be reciprocally rejected does not show that individuals cannot meaningfully
follow them in their personal or social lives; it is only that such convictions can-
not provide the basis for general and reciprocal restrictions on action or for the
exercise of political force among persons who are in reasonable disagreement
about them." Id.
213 Rainer Forst The Limits of Toleration, 11 CONSTELLATIONS 312, 317 (2004).
214 FORST, TOLERATION IN CONFLICT,supra note 203, at 455.
215 Id. at 455-56.
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cisely here that toleration comes into play: based on
the insight that, concerning the central issue in dis-
pute, there are insufficient grounds for exercising le-,
gal force as long as the status of the embryo, for ex-
ample, remains a matter of reasonable disagreement,
and hence that, other fundamental considerations
(liberty rights, claims to psychological welfare, pro-
moting health, long-term consequences, etc.) must -
prevail. 216
Thus, one group cannot force a second to accept a right to choose.
Nor can the second group force the first to adopt a right to life. In a
group rights context, even majoritarian group decisions cannot com-
pel the compliance of individual members unless these criterion of
reciprocity and justification hold within the group itself. All coercive
rules enforced over its members must be reciprocally. and actually
justifiable to all group members. If a single member can and does
claim reasonable disagreement, the proposed rule cannot be en-
forced against them.
As a solution, Forst's principle of toleration is imperfect. By
granting a single individual a veto right over the group's religious
practice, Forst's framework presents the same "tyranny of the mi-
nority" problem addressed above in Part II.A.2. A single individual
may refuse to consent, and, as a result of Forst's reciprocity rule, de-
rail the corporate exercise of religion. Rather than concede to this
one rebel, however, the group might instead provide that individual
a seamless exit option. It might, for example, secure comparable em-
ployment for that individual elsewhere. As another alternative, the
Court might settle for a Rawlsian "justifiability" rather than "actually
justified."217 It need not look for actual unanimous acceptance of a
rule, but rather for reasons justifying the rule that ought to be ac-
cepted by reasonable people. In this manner, the Court could ignore
216 Id. at 466.
217 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 216 (1996) ("[O]ur exercise of political
power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance
with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be ex-
pected to endorse in the light of the principles and ideals acceptable to them as
reasonable and rational."
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the idiosyncratic preferences of a solitary hold-out.218 Moreover, the
search for the standards embraced by the "reasonable man" is a logic
that ought to be familiar to any law school graduate. Thus modified,
it should provide a workable solution in the context of corporate
rights.
Finally, it should be noted that neither voluntariness nor tol-
eration resolves completely the problems of plural sovereignty sug-
gested in Part II.A.2 above. In a liberal democratic polity, social and
political justice may require that the state provide individuals with
adequate freedoms to autonomously pursue their own conception of
the good life. Accordingly, norms of consent and tolerance prohibit
the state from pursuing, through, e.g., legislation, any ethical value
superfluous to fundamental liberal norms. The state cannot, for ex-
ample, compel religious observance or, for that matter, compulsory
vegetarianism. But groups, as expressions of individuals' particular
shared conception of the good life, are allowed a more ethical bent.
Groups can, even when applying voluntariness and toleration within
the unique group context, pursue a specific "comprehensive view-
point" (in Rawls' language) that would violate norms of social justice
if applied in a broader context.219 This is because each individual
218 This modification approaches Rawls' take on justice, viz., to assign rights and
liberties based upon objectively rational human decision-making rather than
from actual, real-life consent. See generally RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971);
JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY
OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 92-94 (William Rehg trans., 1996). Habermas argues
that a discursive framework of rights, like the one elaborated by Forst, derives
from a Kantian model (like Rawls') based upon reason, e.g., the Categorical Im-
perative and universalizing logic. Id. Habermas, Forst, and other deliberative
democrats reject objective "R"eason because, inter alia, it is unreliable and has
no particular claim to authority. They instead offer a democratic solution: Laws
(rights) are just in so far as people actually accept them based upon reasons
they also accept-whether those reasons are based upon "Reason" or not. Rain-
er Forst, trans. Jeffrey Flynn, THE RIGHT TO JUSTIFICATION: ELEMENTS OF A
CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY OF JUSTICE 41-44 (2007).
2 See Rainer Forst, The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right tojus-
tification: A Reflexive Approach, 120 ETHICS 711 (July 2010). In this essay, Forst
provides a way out of the "comprehensive" vs. "liberal" conundrum by offering
a procedural, discursive theory of democratic rights. Id. Specifically, for Forst,
rights do not exist transcendentally, are not deduced logically, but are instead
419
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group member may reciprocally and generally agree to, for example,
impose religious norms on the group's membership-an imposition
unthinkable if undertaken by the state. If such a group becomes
'large and powerful, one might find two centers of political power be-
ginning to compete and to overlap, pitting universal social justice
and liberal rights, i.e., the jurisdiction of the liberal state, against the
group's self-determined commitment to pursue a particular religious
faith. Scholars of legal pluralism should find this dilemma familiar.220
Depending on the size and resources of the group in question, as well
as the availability, openness and vigor of other groups within civil
society, it is conceivable that a liberal democratic polity might slouch
towards a modern-day Investiture Crisis. The liberal state might find
itself confronting a powerful and influential religious 'polity' that has
eschewed, democratically and deliberately, the Bill of Rights. Never-
theless, applying the concepts of exit and tolerance to groups will
ameliorate at least some of the areas of contestation that emerge out
of the conflicting claims of these competing sovereigns. One example
is addressed below.
IV. APPLYING VOLUNTARINESS AND TOLERANCE TO HOBBY LOBBY
To tease out the implications of applying voluntariness and
toleration, an example may prove useful. The Hobby Lobby litigation
involves the exercise of a group right in the context of potentially co-
ercive circumstances. Namely, Hobby Lobby claims a right to refuse
to provide funding" for certain contraceptive medication (which
"redeemed discursively." Id Our rights are precisely those that we grant each
other upon reflexive agreement-and nothing more. Id. In this way, the "ethi-
cal" values that are eliminated from our menu of rights by a more a rationalist,
Rawlsian conception of political justice (e.g., those rights that cannot be justified
using his contractualist "original position") can instead be incorporated. See
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (giving an illustration of illiberal group
practices).
220 See generally JEAN L. COHEN, GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY (2012) (providing
a compelling and thorough investigation of the problems arising from legal and
sovereign pluralism in a global context).
2 This point is somewhat controversial. If we view the "funding" of a health
insurance plan as part of employee compensation, rather than as part of corpo-
[Vol. 14420
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Hobby Lobby deems "abortifacients") mandated for coverage by the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), a mandate meant
to protect the interests of some of Hobby Lobby's "members," i.e., its
employees.222 Given their control over the internal corporate deci-
sion-making hierarchy, the company's small set of shareholders sets
the corporate "personality," and, therefore, shapes the corporation's
claim to free exercise. It is as yet unclear whether the company's
13,000 employees consent to the claimed group right.223 It is not un-
reasonable to assume that because employees usually agree to work
so that they can earn a wage, and not so they can practice religion,
they had no role in forming this particular corporate will. Having
been successful in its litigation, the company can now effectively
prevent many employees from accessing the medication, which
bears exorbitant costs if purchased outside an insurance plan.224 In
other words, the Hobby Lobby litigation perhaps "has more to do
with religious employers foisting their religion on female employees
than with government foisting its secular values on religious em-
ployers.225
Given the facts of the case, applying the principles of volun-
tariness weigh in favor of employee voice rather than exit. The avail-
ability of free exit for Hobby Lobby's employees, who make, at most,
rate resources, the corporation has no claim that such funding can form of its
own religious exercise because it is not properly its property. One could make
such a case, given that ERISA regulations impose fiduciary duties and distribute
participant rights in such a way as to largely remove the funds from the compa-
ny's discretionary control. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2015) (funds must
be managed for "the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants
and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering
the plan" ); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a(1) (detailing these fiduciary duties); 29 C.F.R.
§ 2550.408c-2 (regulating the amount of compensation that may be paid to plan
managers); 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (limiting investment in the employer's own se-
curities).
2 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2799 (Ginsberg, J., dis-
senting) (describing the government's compelling interest in providing
healthcare to individual stakeholders through the ACA).
2 Id. at 2795-96.
224 See Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 22, at 58.
m Garfield, supra note 165, at 24.
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$14 an hour,226 is in all likelihood limited. In the contemporary eco-
nomic climate, a replacement job may not be forthcoming. Nor is it
likely that these low-wage workers have sufficient savings to weath-
er long-term unemployment. The barrier to exit may be amplified by
the lack of many affordable health care insurance alternatives should
the employees quit their jobs. If the facts do show that exit is unreal-
istic, employees could be given "voice" over the issue through, e.g,
unionization, worker control over their own health plans, or a corpo-
rate franchise akin to the kind enjoyed by Hobby Lobby sharehold-
ers. 27 The company could hold a referendum on the singleissue of
the provision of the medication at issue. Meanwhile, the sharehold-
ers, who appear to have greater resources, might more easily exer-
cise their "exit" option. They perhaps do not rely on participation in
Hobby Lobby as much as its employees--at least not financially. By
giving employees voice and affording shareholders relatively seam-
less exit, no worker would be coerced into religion, and no share-
holder need be coerced out of it.
Alternatively, as perhaps a more compelling and pragmatic
option, a principle of toleration could be applied. Such would forbid
the corporation from forcing its members to abide by a religious
proscription that is, as described above by Forst,2 28 actually subject
to reasonable disagreement-a proposition supported by the ongo-
ing and lively public debate regarding Planned Parenthood and the
226 See Leonardo Blair, Hobby Lobby Raises Minimum Wage to $14 for Full-Time
Employees, CHRISTIAN POST (Apr. 18, 2013, ' 5:29 PM),
http://www.christianpost.com/news/hobby-lobby-raises-minimum-wage-to-
14-for-full-time-employees-94233 (explaining that Hobby Lobby raised the
minimum wage for full-time, not part-time, employees to $14 an hour).
2 Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. R.
1373, 1392, 1398 (1981). Laycock argues that empowering paid church em-
ployees with, e.g., employment protections, may pervert religious doctrine and
practice, disrupt the free development of religious doctrine, and infringe upon
church autonomy. Id. He is, in a nutshell, invoking an undemocratic "real entity"
theory of corporation and claiming a group right to infringe upon members' in-
dividual labor rights. Id.
228See supra, Part IV.B.
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right to contraceptive healthcare.2 9 Nor could employees force the
employer to abide by their own unique religious beliefs. Such could
only be a fair outcome, because as the law stands now,
employers [like Hobby Lobby] are obligated to ac-
commodate the religious practices of their employees
* only if the cost of doing so is "de minimus" or in-
significant If the Court grants a RFRA exemption to
Hobby Lobby, however, it will create a religious ac-
commodation regime in which the religious practices
of for-profit employers are entitled to accommoda-
tion despite imposing significant costs on their fe-
male employees and covered female dependents,
while those same employers are free from accommo-
dating the religious practices of those same employ-
ees when doing so entails significant costs.2 30
Applying a principle of toleration, i.e., of reciprocal and general justi-
fication, any accommodations can only impose equal and reciprocal
costs, and must be made for all.
229 See, e.g., Robin Marty, Decades After Birth Control Became Legal, It's Still Con-
troversial, ROLLING STONE, (June 6, 2014),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/decades-after-birth-control-
became-legal-its-still-controversial-20140606; Lyle Denniston, The ACA-Birth
Control Controversy, Made Simple, SCOTUSBLOG, (July 15, 2015),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/07/the-aca-birth-control-controversy-
made-simple/; Patricia Miller, What Do Religious Women Think of the Contra-
ceptive Mandate?, ATLANTIC (March 22 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/03/what-do-religious-
women-think-of-the-contraceptive-mandate/388159/; Liam Stack, Florida Gov-
ernor Signs Law to Cut Funding for Abortion Clinics, the N.Y. TIMES (March 25
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/26/us/florida-governor-signs-law-
to-cut-funding-for-abortion-clinics.html?_r=0; Julie Turkewitz, Colorado
Planned Parenthood Clinic Reopens after Deadly Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Feb 15,
2016) http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/16/us/colorado-planned-
parenthood-clinic-reopens-after-deadly-attack.html.
230 Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 22, at 66 (emphasis added).
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V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether or not the U.S. Supreme Court ever
chooses to incorporate principles of voluntariness and toleration to
the growing body of corporate religious law, disaggregating the cor-
poration should at least clarify what is at stake. To date, much of the
debate regarding Hobby Lobby boils down to an overly simplistic and
dichotomous invective.231 On one side, progressives proclaim that
for-profit businesses merit no rights-religious or otherwise.232 For
them, corporations are fictions and can claim nothing that the demo-
cratic legislature has not granted to them. On the other side, advo-
cates of religious freedom demand that any and all people choosing
to exercise religion, no matter how they choose to organize them-
selves, must be granted autonomy. 33 To get to the nut of the conflict,
though, we have to open the black box of group religious exercise.
We must examine, as any proponents of liberal freedoms must, the
impact of public policy and law on actual individuals, not on non-
human organization. When we do so, the illiberal implications of
granting rights to certain groups without first inquiring into the in-
ternal governance structures of those groups becomes quite obvious.
For a church, identifying sufficient possibilities for members to enjoy
exit and voice may be quite straightforward. It would not be surpris-
ing to discover that churchgoers do not depend upon their religious
community for their wages; they join because they expressly consent
to the church's tenets. And so we need not worry about the possibil-
ity of coercion and domination. For a for-profit corporation, howev-
er, matters may prove entirely different.
To be sure, finding a space in liberal democratic thought for
religious rights in the corporate context, as byzantine, fact-intensive,
and context-dependent as that task might be, is an uphill battle. It is
one, however, that is worth fighting. If we are true to our liberal
freedoms, we cannot lose sight of the individuals who may suffer real
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harm from the duties and costs imposed when we enforce the reli-
gious rights of others.
